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GLOBALIZATION, CANADIAN FAMILY
POLICY, AND THE OMISSIONS OF
NEOLIBERALISM*
JANINE BRODIE**
The relationship between globalization, family structures, and
social policy is complex, uneven, and evolving. This Article
examines social policy reform in Canada during the past two
decades in order to advance three propositions about the
relationship between globalization and public policy: first, the
influence of globalization on social policy is neither direct nor
uniform but, instead, strongly mediated by changing political
rationalities; second, neoliberalism is most productively understood
as a contested political rationality that weaves foundational
commitments to the market, market logics, and individualization
into new public policies and regulatory fields and onto existing
ones; and, finally, analyses of contemporary family policy should
be as concerned with the ways in which governments frame social
policy reforms as with the amount that they spend on them.
Describing recent policy interventions in family income support,
maternity, parental benefits, and care policies, this Article describes
how Canadian social policy reform relies on fiscalization, which
presupposes that relatively modest payments to individuals and
families or tax deductions and credits can stand in for social
research and planning, democratic debate, and public
infrastructure. Fiscalization also imagines that families will use
relatively small increments in income for their designated policy
goal in an era when a great many families are coping with declining
incomes, unemployment, and rising debt. Although income support
is necessary for a growing number of Canadian families, this Article
concludes that social policy reform has yet to adequately respond to
contemporary family challenges, including work-life balance and a
growing care deficit.
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INTRODUCTION
The first global recession of the twenty-first century, the deepest
and most diffuse since the Great Depression of the 1930s, has amply
demonstrated that families everywhere are extremely vulnerable to
the "organized irresponsibility"'  that has restructured the
international political economy and national social policy regimes in
the past three decades. Economic globalization, involving globally
integrated production processes and unbounded financial markets,
has generated unprecedented wealth for a fraction of the world's
population. It also has left gaps in wealth and income both within and
between countries as well as troubling economic insecurity and
indebtedness for national treasuries and household budgets alike.2 On
an international scale, the complex and, some would say, irreversible
dimensions of globalization have generated unprecedented flows of
economic migrants, the entrenchment of transnational chains of care
and domestic work, and the consolidation of remittance economies.
The consequences of these and related factors have led many
academics and international agencies to conclude that there is a
fundamental and growing antagonism between the prevailing model
1. ULRICH BECK, ECOLOGICAL POLITICS IN AN AGE OF RISK 58 (Amos Weisz
trans., Polity Press 2002) (1988); ULRICH BECK & ELIZABETH BECK-GERNSHEIM,
INDIVIDUALIZATION: INSTITUTIONALIZED INDIVIDUALISM AND ITS SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 188 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2002).
2. U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS; AID, TRADE AND SECURITY IN AN UNEQUAL
WORLD 1-15 (2005); ARMINE YALNIZYAN, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POLICY





of the economic growth and the maintenance of stable conditions for
social reproduction.3 The latter can be broadly conceived as the
political imaginaries, public policies, and material practices necessary
to sustain and reproduce individuals, families, and communities on a
daily and generational basis.4 In many ways, the 2008 financial
meltdown and ensuing global recession have summoned a "perfect
storm" that has rendered average families ill-equipped to cope with
the progressive downloading of social risks that has accompanied the
disassembling of the postwar welfare state in recent years.' This
Article focuses on changes in family policy in Canada in the past two
decades to explore two themes: first, the evolving relationship
between economic globalization, neoliberal governance, and social
policy; and, second, the ways in which recent policy innovations
imagine and enforce neoliberal constructions of the market and the
self-sufficient individual and family.
Part I of this Article describes two distinct and often conflicting
dimensions of contemporary globalization: globality and globalism.
While the former envisions the world as a singular political space,
globalism and especially neoliberal globalism is a political rationality
that has been linked to changes in contemporary social policy
regimes. This Article finds little support for the popular argument
that globalism has had a uniform impact on postwar social policy
regimes, forcing all countries to make dramatic cuts in social
spending.6 Part II drills deeper into the relationship between
neoliberalism and social policy reform. Outlining differing
interpretations of neoliberal governance, this Article argues that it is
productively understood as a political rationality, which, experimental
and complex, has resulted in a wide range of social policy reforms.
Part III describes the transition in Canada from a social liberal to a
neoliberal social policy regime. Part IV describes recent innovations
in Canadian family policy and highlights the ways in which they are
predicated on an underlying commitment to the primacy of the
market as the source of family well-being and choice. This Article
ultimately concludes that these new social policies, while providing
3. Isabella Bakker & Stephen Gill, Ontology, Method, and Hypothesis, in POWER,
PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 17, 27 (Isabella Bakker & Stephen Gill eds.,
2003).
4. See id. at 19-24.
5. Christine Dugas, "Perfect Storm" Puts All Types in Financial Peril, USA TODAY,
Mar. 26,2009, at B1.
6. See BOB JESSOP, THE FUTURE OF THE CAPITALIST STATE 147 (2002) (arguing
that social policy should not be isolated from economic policy).
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some needed income support to poor families, fail to address the
growing care deficit in Canada.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
There is now rich and diverse literature that documents the
multiple and varied pressures that globalization allegedly asserts on
social reproduction processes and on diverse family forms in both
developed and developing countries.' This literature, however, often
does not unpack the concept of "globalization," assuming erroneously
that its parameters are both stable and transparent to all.
Globalization is a variable and contested term, not the least because
of the vast array of economic, political, and cultural transformations
that have been attributed to it.8 Generally, it is useful to think of
globalization as comprising two conceptually, although not always
discursively or politically, distinct dimensions.9
The first dimension, globality 0 consists of transnational flows of
economic, cultural, and technological forces that have progressively
broken barriers of time, space, and nation, fashioning the planet into
a global political space and its diverse peoples into "overlapping
communities of fate.""1 Globality is often represented as being
epochal, transformational, and irreversible."l It is also widely
understood that the reconfiguration of space rendered by globality
has generated social and political problems that can no longer be
contained or resolved within the competencies or territorial
boundaries of a single national state. 3 As globalization scholar Ulrich
Beck further explains, globality implies that "nothing which happens
7. See generally JESSOP, supra note 6 (examining the multiple impacts of economic
globalization on social and political relations and state formations); Bakker & Gill, supra
note 3 (constructing a framework with which to conceptualize global changes in the global
organization of production and social reproduction); Janine Brodie, Globalization and the
Social Question, in GOVERNING UNDER STRESS: MIDDLE POWERS AND THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 12 (Marjorie Griffin Cohen & Stephen Clarkson eds.,
2004) (discussing the challenges and consequences of neoliberal globalism for semi-
peripheral states).
8. See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, WHAT Is GLOBALIZATION? 1-6 (Patrick Camiller trans.,
2000); Mike Featherstone, Genealogies of the Global, 23 THEORY CULTURE & SOC'Y 387,
387-419(2006).
9. See BECK, supra note 8, at 8-10.
10. Id. at 9 ("Globality means that we have been living for a long time in a world
society....").
11. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND
CULTURE 445 (1999).
12. See BECK, supra note 8, at 8-11.
13. Janine Brodie, Globalization In/security and the Paradoxes of the Social, in
POWER, PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 47, 50-51.
1562 [Vol. 88
CANADIAN FAMILY POLICY
on our planet is only a limited local event." 4 Globality does not
necessarily prevent the national state from acting to cushion its
citizens from the new social risks associated with global restructuring,
among them, precarious employment, declining incomes and benefits,
and work-life balance issues. 5 Instead, it requires political actors to
innovate, to coordinate actions on international and transnational
scales, and to formulate local solutions to global social challenges.
The second dimension of globalization, globalism,16 refers to a
political mindset or political rationality that promotes a universal
worldview and standardized governing practices that potentially
trump national policy preferences and state sovereignty. The
prevailing experiment with globalism, neoliberal globalism, prioritizes
economic growth and market logics over most other goals and
institutions of governance.17 As Beck further explains, it is an
"ideology of rule by the world market," asserting that the
complexities of politics "can be run in the way that a company is
run."18 Consolidated under the so-called "Washington Consensus" in
the 1980s, neoliberal globalism has promoted, with varying degrees of
transparency, coercion, and consensus, a bundle of reinforcing
governing instruments, prominent among them privatization, trade
liberalization, deregulation, public sector reduction, and social policy
reform. 9 This model of governance, although tarnished and
destabilized by the current economic crisis, aspires to subject both
citizens and governments to the rigors of markets, ideally constraining
them from interfering with global capital flows, self-regulating
markets, and consumer choice and sovereignty.0
Although national governments are challenged to develop
strategies to adjust to the new social risks associated with globality,
the issue of (under)investment in families has been more directly
linked to the practices and policies advanced through neoliberal
14. BECK, supra note 8, at 11.
15. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION: ADAPTING
WELFARE STATES TO WOMEN'S NEW ROLES 56 (2009).
16. See BECK, supra note 8, at 9 ("By globalism I mean the view that the world
market eliminates or supplants political action ... .
17. See Brodie, supra note 7, at 12-28.
18. BECK, supra note 8, at 9.
19. GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY: GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SPACES 8 (Wendy
Lamer & William Walters eds., 2004).
20. See Stephen Gill, Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary
Neoliberalism, 24 MILLENNIUM J. INT'L STUD. 399,399-423 (1995).
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globalism.21 The so-called "strong version of the globalization thesis,"
in particular, asserts that the unprecedented capacities of capital to
move around the world forces national governments to compete with
one another in a race to the bottom in order to retain and attract
investment.2 This unrelenting pressure on national governments to
adhere to the fundamentals, to deregulate, to open new markets, and
to cut taxes places pronounced downward pressure on social policy
spending and program development.3 Consequently, "the premises of
the welfare state ... melt under the withering sun of globalization." 24
From this perspective, a fundamental paradox lies at the heart of the
neoliberal globalism's policy prescriptions. Many of the negative
social outcomes associated with this package of economic policies,
such as recurrent financial crises, growing gaps in wealth and income,
precarious and under employment, and stagnant and declining family
incomes, maximize the need for governments to shelter individuals,
families, and communities from the vagaries and instabilities of global
markets. These same governing ideas, however, minimize the
conceptual and political spaces and strategic instruments necessary to
craft a social architecture that is responsive to both old and new social
risks. This "paradox of the social" is firmly situated in neoliberal
political rationalities.
Contrary to the predictions of the strong globalization thesis,
however, the world's social policy regimes have not converged at the
bottom. Although neoliberal policy prescriptions have prevailed for a
quarter century, national social policy regimes demonstrate
remarkable variation in the ways in which these governing
orientations have been internalized and implemented on a national
scale. Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") data on total public social expenditures and total
expenditures on family policy, for example, show remarkable
consistency and variability in public social spending in the past thirty
years. Countries with a legacy of comprehensive social policies, social
democratic regimes such as Sweden and Norway, continue to
outspend, as measured by percentage of Gross Domestic Product
("GDP"), characteristically less generous liberal regimes such as
21. See generally Rianne Mahon, The OECD's Discourse on the Reconciliation of
Work and Family Life, GLOBAL SOC. POL'Y, Aug. 2009, at 183, 183 (examining the role of
soft powers in the formation of social policies).
22. PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION 4-5 (2d
ed. 1999).
23. See Gill, supra note 20, at 402-05.
24. BECK, supra note 8, at 1.
25. Brodie, supra note 7, at 24-25.
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Canada and the United States.26 Moreover, overall social spending
has increased in most OECD countries in the past three decades.2 7 In
Canada, for example, total public social spending increased from
13.7% of GDP in 1980 to 16.5% in 2005,28 while the equivalent
statistics for the United States are 13.1% and 15.9%, respectively.29
Similarly, most OECD countries, with the glaring exception of the
United States, have increased total family policy spending between
1980 and 2005.30 While the United States' family policy expenditures
decreased from 0.8% to 0.6% of GDP, Canada's spending increased
only marginally from 0.7% to 1.1%.31 Overall, these data betray the
contention that globalization has forced a global convergence at the
bottom in the social policy field. These findings also are consistent
with Duane Swank's more detailed comparative study of the impact
of globalization on developed welfare states, which also found little
evidence in aggregate public expenditure and similar data to support
the "convergence-at-the-bottom" thesis.3 2 Swank concluded that the
domestic impacts of international capital mobility are complex,
variable, and strongly mediated by national political histories and
policy path dependencies.33
II. NEOLIBERALISM AND SOCIAL POLICY REFORM
Aggregate public expenditure data paint policy landscapes with
broad quantitative strokes, shedding important light on the fiscal side
of social policy continuity and change. These data, however, do not
address equally important questions relating to whether and how
neoliberal priorities and governing strategies undermine established
social programs, reinvent others, and inform new initiatives, thereby
reshaping citizen choices, subjectivities, and the constraints and
possibilities of daily life. These themes are less accessible to social
policy analysts than those explored through public accounts data but
are critical to understanding contemporary family policy. Research in
this vein indicates that the imprint of neoliberalism on social policy
26. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD SOCIAL







32. See DUANE SWANK, GLOBAL CAPITAL, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICY
CHANGE IN DEVELOPED WELFARE STATES 274-89 (2002).
33. ld. at 5.
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has not been uniform across advanced liberal democracies, leading
some to question the coherence and utility of neoliberalism as an
analytic concept or, indeed, whether the neoliberal moment has
passed.34 On closer inspection, however, these debates reflect
different perspectives on neoliberalism itself.
Governmentality theorist Wendy Larner points out that
neoliberalism has been variously understood as a specific template or
amalgam of policies, as a political ideology and political project, and
as a distinct set of discourses, practices, and expertise that together
form a rationale for governance.35 While the lines between these three
perspectives are sometimes blurred, the policy template approach
typically focuses, both positively and negatively, on the policies and
institutions (subnational, national, and international) that in recent
decades have advanced free trade, privatization, deregulation, and
the reduction of the public sector.36 The second perspective, often
allying with the first, understands neoliberalism as a political ideology
and as a political project that advances the material interests of the
capitalist class and of the global North at the expense of socially
subordinate classes and the global South. As David Harvey further
explains, neoliberalism is a "class project, masked by a lot of neo-
liberal rhetoric about individual freedom, liberty, personal
responsibility, privatisation and the free market."37 "These were
means," he argues, "towards the restoration and consolidation of
class power, and [the] neo-liberal project has been fairly successful."38
The final perspective treats neoliberalism as a political rationality or
"a system of meaning that constitutes institutions, practices and
identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways."39 This final
perspective draws from Michel Foucault's suggestive formulation of
the concept of governmentality, which linked practices of government
(the conduct of conduct) with mentalities or knowledges (savoirs)
about governing.' The governmentality perspective holds that the act
34. See, e.g., John Clarke, Living With/in and Without Neo-Liberalism, 51 FOCAAL
EUR. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 135, 135-47 (2008); Neil Smith, Comment, Neoliberalism-
Dominant but Dead, 51 FOCAAL EUR. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 155,155-57 (2008).
35. Wendy Lamer, Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality, 63 STUD. POL.
ECON. 5, 8-15 (2000).
36. See Gill, supra note 20, at 411-23.
37. David Harvey, Is This Really the End of Neoliberalism?, COUNTER PUNCH
NEWSL., Mar. 13-15, 2009, available at www.counterpunch.orgharvey03l32009.html.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Larner, supra note 35, at 12 (emphasis added).
40. See MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNING SOCIETIES: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL RULE 50-51 (2007); MITCHELL DEAN,
GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY 2-4, 10-16 (1999);
[Vol. 881566
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of governing proceeds under, indeed finds its justification in,
particular ways of seeing political problems and that there is an
intrinsic link between "a way of representing and knowing a
phenomenon" and ways "of acting upon it so as to transform it."41
Although historically shifting and always contested, political
rationalities render reality "thinkable," identify the "appropriate
forms, objects, and limits of politics," and the problems to be solved,
as well as the programs, governing instruments, and strategies for
intervening to achieve these ends.42 Once operational, these programs
of government permeate different policy fields and, in so doing, recast
social identities, the citizen-state bargain, and the material practices
of everyday life.43
The tangible imprints of neoliberal political rationalities on
national social policy architectures in recent decades have been
experimental, complex, and reflexive, sometimes deploying governing
strategies and public policies that only indirectly invoke market
logics' or, in fact, may appear to violate such prescribed neoliberal
fundamentals as fiscal austerity and the minimalist state. The
unprecedented bailouts by the United States of the financial sector
and automotive sector and the stimulus package enacted by the
Canadian government are recent examples of such violations from
the prescriptions of neoliberal governance. The apparent absence of a
stable or core social policy template also has led some analysts to
interpret relative stability in social spending as evidence of neoliberal
globalism's modest impact on social policy,45 while slight increases
and new spending are sometimes interpreted as harbingers of a post-
neoliberal "social investment" era.' To be sure, neoliberalism is not a
monolithic governing formula, not the least because of the many
variations of neoliberal discourses, technologies, and interventions
that have emerged in the past three decades, the shifting parameters
of neoliberal governance during these years, and the different ways in
which counter "discourses, projects, practices, and imaginaries" have
MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 108-09 (Michel Senellart ed.,
Graham Burchell trans., 2004).
41. PETER MILLER & NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE PRESENT 15 (2008).
42. Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of
Government, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 173,175-83 (1991).
43. See MILLER & ROSE, supra note 41, at 62-78.
44. Clarke, supra note 34, at 136.
45. See SWANK, supra note 32, passim.
46. Jane Jenson, Citizenship in the Era of "New Social Risks": What Happened to
Gender Inequalities?, in GENDERING THE NATION-STATE: CANADIAN AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 185,195-96 (Yasmeen Abu-Laban ed., 2008).
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been incorporated into neoliberal frameworks on national and local
scales.47 These qualities of unevenness, instability, cooptation, and
reflexivity, however, less detract from than define the contemporary
neoliberal governing experiment, especially in the social policy field.
Neoliberal governance, in other words, is marked by instability,
contradiction, and experimentation.
Yet, despite important cross-national differences in social policy
reform, neoliberal social policy regimes are nonetheless informed by
a cluster of core assumptions that mark a radical departure from the
generative orientations of the postwar welfare state.48 Neoliberalism
draws its intellectual force from neoclassical economics, which
progressively gained influence in the corridors of international
financial institutions, the transnational corporate sector, and national
finance bureaucracies in the last decades of the twentieth century.49
Neoclassical economics embroidered laissez-faire imaginaries about
self-regulating markets and the minimalist state onto a series of
claims about the universal efficiencies of markets logics. However,
"[n]eoliberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only
or even primarily focused on the economy:"5 neoliberal public policy
has "cultural, social and political effects that exceed its surface
operations."'" In particular, it extends and disseminates market logics
and calculations and market-mimicking practices to a vast array of
social and political institutions, reaching down into and transforming,
among other things, individual subjectivities, gender orders, and the
organization of households.52
John Clarke argues that neoliberal public policy is invariably
grounded in the combination of four foundational orientations: an
unequivocal commitment to market rationalities; the celebration of
47. Clarke, supra note 34, at 139.
48. See Janine Brodie, The New Social "isms": Individualization and Social Policy Re-
form in Canada, in CONTESTED INDIVIDUALIZATION: DEBATES ABOUT
CONTEMPORARY PERSONHOOD 153, 157-61 (Cosmo Howard ed., 2007) [hereinafter
Brodie, The New Social "isms"]; Janine Brodie, The Social in Social Citizenship, in
RECASTING THE SOCIAL IN CITIZENSHIP 20, 39-42 (Engin F. Isin ed., 2008) [hereinafter
Brodie, Social Citizenship].
49. See BEN FINE, SOCIAL CAPITAL VERSUS SOCIAL THEORY 9-10 (2001).
50. WENDY BROWN, EDGEWORK: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS 39-40 (2005).
51. WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF
IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 8-9 (2006).
52. See Clarke, supra note 34, at 141; Wendy McKeen, The Politics of the National
Children's Agenda: A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Neoliberal Social Policy Change,
in PUBLIC POLICY FOR WOMEN: THE STATE, INCOME, SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET




the possessive, self-sufficient individual; preoccupation with
calculating efficiencies, primarily understood as being economic; and
the proliferation of multiple forms of authority beyond the national
state. 3 Over the span of a generation, these rationalities first
weakened and then displaced the vision, expertise, policies, and
practices of postwar social liberalism.54 With varying degrees of
success, neoliberal political rationalities have been written into social
governance through what Clarke terms "the double process of
articulation and assemblage."5 Some things are "articulated into neo-
liberalism's repertoire" while in other instances, elements "from neo-
liberalism's repertoire" are overlaid onto "specific/local assemblages
or constellations."56 In other words, some things are drawn into the
market, individualized, and subjected to market metrics and other
forms of authority. The privatization of public assets and services, the
creation of new markets, and the commodification of care are
examples of this process. In other instances, neoliberal fundamentals
are imposed upon and embedded within established governing
processes, political spaces, and identities through such instruments as
the new public management, active social welfare programs, and the
fiscalization of social policy. For example, the public service is obliged
to act according to private sector logics, welfare recipients are
expected to provide labor to pay for their social assistance, and social
welfare programs are transformed into cash payments to individuals.
The incremental restructuring of Canada's postwar social policy
architecture, as Part IV of this Article argues, reflected a two-prong
strategy of first, disassembling the postwar social citizenship model
and second, devising new policies that both respond to contemporary
social needs, especially with respect to family income support and a
growing care deficit, and assembling and articulating neoliberal
political rationalities in policy design and implementation. The next
Part of this Article provides a brief overview of the construction of
Canada's postwar social architecture and the centrality of families
and family policy to that model of social governance.
53. Clarke, supra note 34, at 140-41.
54. For a discussion of the Canadian case, see JANINE BRODIE & ISABELLA BAKKER,
WHERE ARE THE WOMEN?: GENDER EQUITY, BUDGETS AND CANADIAN PUBLIC
POLICY 15-41 (2008).
55. Clarke, supra note 34, at 144.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
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III. FROM SOCIAL LIBERALISM TO NEOLIBERALISM
Across the industrialized world, the Great Depression of the
1930s prompted widespread repudiation of the core assumptions and
policies of laissez-faire liberalism, but a decade and another
devastating world war passed before an alternative political
rationality, social liberalism, gained ascendancy, and the pillars of the
postwar Keynesian welfare state were set in place.57 Postwar social
liberalism, similar to its neoliberal successor, materialized in a variety
of policy agendas and regime types, ranging from the modest liberal
welfare regimes of North America to the "cradle to grave" social
governance systems of Northern Europe.58 Yet, despite pronounced
differences in the scope and depth of postwar welfare states, all were
informed by two foundational rationalities. First, it was widely
accepted that markets were inherently unstable and that governments
necessarily had to intervene to minimize these instabilities, largely
through fiscal and monetary policies, and to cushion citizens and
families from systemic and life cycle risks through collective
provision.59 Second, social planning, social policy, and the law were
understood as authoritative and efficacious governing instruments
that could correct for systemic barriers and inequalities and promote
broader visions of social justice.' These foundational orientations
toward social government would later become primary targets for
neoliberal critics of the welfare state.6"
However, if the foundational rationales for the postwar welfare
state were formed in response to market failures, they also addressed
what Folbre calls "family failures," particularly the diminished
capacities of family and kin networks to adequately provide care and
subsistence for those in need.62 The new industrialism in early
57. Brodie, Social Citizenship, supra note 48, at 36-38.
58. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 9-
15 (1990).
59. See Janine Brodie, Reforming Social Justice in Neoliberal Times, 1 STUD. SOC.
JUST. 93, 97-98 (2007).
60. Id. at 98-99; see GEORGES CAMPEAU, FROM UT TO El: WAGING WAR ON THE
WELFARE STATE 72-73 (Richard Howard trans., 2005).
61. See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENTS 1-17 (1988)
(discussing increased individual responsibility and welfare dependency); LAWRENCE M.
MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY 185-209, 247-49 (1992) (discussing condemned
passive welfare programs); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL
POLICY, 1950-1980, at 196-204 (1984) (raising questions about the underlying
assumptions of social policy in the United States); JOHN RICHARDS, RETOOLING THE
WELFARE STATE 139--84 (1997) (criticizing Canadian social policy).




twentieth century North America, for example, saw vast waves of
internal migration from farms to cities for lucrative manufacturing
jobs, followed by the collapse of laissez-faire capitalism in the 1930s.63
These processes generated extraordinary social dislocations that
surpassed the combined social reproductive capacities of women's
domestic labor, the family, the Church, and the community. This crisis
in care informed the analyses and recommendations of the 1943
Marsh Report,' the founding blueprint for the Canadian welfare
state. It embodied a widespread consensus about the "basic lessons to
be learned from the experience of the thirties" and appropriate
pathway for the future.65 "The only rational way to cope with the
large and complicated problem of the insecurities of working and
family life," the report explained, "is by recognizing and legislating
for particular categories or areas of risk or need."'  The report
soundly endorsed the principle of social security as "a form of
investment in physical health, morale, educational opportunities for
children, and family stability."'67 "The basic soundness of social
insurance," it concluded, "is that it is underwritten by the community
as a whole."68
The federal government constructed Canada's postwar social
architecture incrementally, one program after another, in the two
decades following the Second World War. Canada's welfare state and
its version of social citizenship rights rested on three layers of social
protection: 69 first, universal programs, such as Old Age Security
(1927),7° mother's allowance (1944),7 and, eventually, health care
(1967)72 were available to all Canadians as a right of citizenship;
second, social insurance programs, principally Unemployment
Insurance (1945) 71 and the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans
(1966),7 were premised on labor force participation and payroll
63. Brodie, Social Citizenship, supra 48, at 35-36.
64. L. C. MARSH, REPORT ON SOCIAL SECURITY FOR CANADA 9 (Univ. of Toronto
Press 1975) (1943).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 11.
69. Jenson, supra note 46, at 189.
70. For a discussion of the evolution of the Canadian system of social protection, see
ROYAL COMM'N ON THE ECON. UNION AND DEV. PROSPECTS FOR CAN., Human






NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
deductions and; third, social welfare, comprised of modest and
conditional income and other supports, funded and administered by
the provinces, for those on the margins or excluded from the paid
labor force (for example, single mothers, the disabled, and the
unemployable)." In 1966, the federal government assumed half of the
cost of all provincial welfare programs under the provisions of the
Canada Assistance Plan ("CAP").76 Until 1995, CAP, in effect,
ensured that all Canadians demonstrating need were eligible for
social assistance without time limits or conditions such as workfare.77
Together, these policies underwrote a model of social
reproduction that was premised on two political imaginaries: first, a
stable, working-middle-class nuclear family comprised of a male
breadwinner, a dependent wife providing unpaid domestic and care
labor, and several children who could aspire to social mobility; and
second, a family wage, which was an amalgam of wages and
employment benefits often enhanced through collective bargaining,
progressive taxation, universal social programs, social security, and a
variety of targeted income supports for children, the disabled, and the
elderly. However, this formula for family security and social
reproduction was short-lived. Beginning in the 1980s, the federal
government regularly raised the specter of recessions, rising
budgetary deficits, an impending "debt wall," and global competition
as reasons for abandoning the foundational premises of the welfare
state.78 The federal social envelope was progressively stripped of
funds, the Unemployment Insurance program was repeatedly
restructured to reduce benefits and tighten eligibility as well as to
minimize the federal government's obligations under the program,
and universal social programs for families and the elderly were
subjected to deindexation to inflation and clawbacks through
taxation.7 9
Canadian social policy analysts and activists generally agree that
the 1995 federal budget and, in particular, its unveiling of the Canada
Health and Social Transfer ("CHST"),80 a federal block grant to the
provinces for social spending, was a watershed in Canadian social
75. See Jenson, supra note 46, at 189-90.
76. See BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 22-23.
77. See id.
78. See STEPHEN MCBRIDE, PARADIGM SHIFT: GLOBALIZATION AND THE
CANADIAN STATE 79-81 (2001).
79. See SHERRI TORJMAN, THE LET-THEM-EAT-CAKE-LAW 1-2 (1995), available at
http://www.caledoninst.orgfPublications/PDF/485ENG.pdf.
80. See BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 21-24.
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policy development.81 The CHST arguably released the federal
government from any lingering commitments to the aspirations of
social liberalism, devolving the weight of responsibility for social
policy design and funding to sub-national governments and clearing
space to articulate neoliberal policy logics in new federal policy
initiatives. The 1995 budget struck debilitating financial blows to the
federal social policy envelope and eliminated many of the spaces
within the federal bureaucracy that had previously been responsible
for social policy development. Further, with the introduction of the
CHST, the federal government both ended its commitment to share
with the provinces the costs of social assistance and reduced the
amount of funds that it transferred to the provinces to support health
care, social services, and post-secondary education.82 The value of
cash transfers to the provinces fell rapidly and dramatically, forcing
significant cuts to provincial social assistance programs and related
social services in particular.83 Within a few years, however, the federal
government arguably, having achieved a budgetary surplus at the
expense of the provinces and Canada's most vulnerable, tentatively
re-entered the social policy terrain. Part IV of this Article traces the
ways in which federal family policy has been reconfigured in recent
years.
IV. CANADIAN FAMILY POLICY REFORM 1996-2009
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, successive
Canadian federal governments, both Conservative and Liberal,
progressively eroded the social programs that underpinned the
postwar ideal of social citizenship rights. With the return of federal
budget surpluses in the waning years of the millennium, however, the
federal government launched a series of new initiatives to address the
new social risks generated by an increasingly
continentalized/globalized national economy.8' These new initiatives
focused almost exclusively on two pressing constraints for many
Canadian families: first, declining incomes among middle- and low-
81. See ARMINE YALNIZYAN, CANADIAN FEMINIST ALLIANCE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ACTION, CANADA'S COMMITMENT TO EQUALITY: A GENDER
ANALYSIS OF THE LAST TEN FEDERAL BUDGETS (1995-2004), at 32-34 (2005), available
at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National-Office
_Pubs/2005/CanadaCommitmentToEquality.pdf.
82. See id. at 32-33.
83. See BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 50-54.
84. See, e.g., James J. Rice & Michael J. Prince, Martin's Moment: The Social Policy
Agenda of a New Prime Minister, in How OTTAWA SPENDS 2004-2005, at 111, 116 (G.
Bruce Doern ed., 2004) (highlighting, in particular, the initiatives listed in Table 1, infra).
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income households, especially among the working poor; and second,
the growing crisis in care.
Canada's emersion into the global era has brought about
profound and rapid changes to the labor force and to the organization
of family life. Similar to other industrialized countries, there has been
an unrelenting decline in well-paying manufacturing jobs, which were
the lynchpins of the postwar family wage and the male breadwinner
model of social reproduction. The 2008 financial crisis saw the loss of
357,000 manufacturing jobs, but, already in the decade, over half a
million manufacturing jobs in Canada had disappeared." These jobs
have been partially replaced by precarious, often part-time, positions
with low wages and few benefits. 6
The past two decades also have brought a growing gap between
upper- and lower-income households in Canada as well as a marked
deterioration in the financial security of most Canadian families.
Although top earning households saw a 16.4% increase in income
(based on median earnings of full-time, full-year earners) in the 1980-
2005 period, the earnings of middle income groups stagnated and
those of the bottom group declined by 20.6%.87 Record high levels of
personal household debt and low levels of saving reflect the
vulnerability of middle- and low-income families.88 The 2008 financial
crisis and the ensuing abrupt and deep recession have accelerated this
decline with stubbornly high unemployment rates, especially in the
manufacturing sector, and sharply devalued household net worth,
particularly with respect to equity investments and pension savings.8 9
Partially in response to these deteriorating economic indicators,
an unprecedented number of women and mothers have entered the
Canadian work force. The progressive erosion of the postwar family
wage has meant that two incomes are now necessary to support most
middle and lower class families. In 2004, Statistics Canada reported
that women constituted 47% of the Canadian workforce, growing to
85. See ARMINE YALNIZYAN, EXPOSED: REVEALING TRUTHS ABOUT CANADA'S
RECESSION 18 (2009), available at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/defauljfiles/
uploads/publications/National-Office-Pubs/2009/Exposed-Revealing-Truths-About-Can
adasRecession.pdf.
86. Leah F. Vosko, Precarious Employment and the Challenges for Employment
Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR WOMEN, supra note 52, at 374,375-78.
87. See Conference Board of Canada, Income Inequality, http://www.conferenceboard
.ca/HCP/Details/society/income-inequality.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
88. YALNIZYAN, supra note 81, at 25-27.
89. See id. at 26-27.
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50% during the first quarter of the 2009 recession. 90 Approximately
69% of women with children under the age of three years are
employed, double the figure of 1976, and 77% of women with
children aged between three and five years are in the labor force, up
from 37% in 1976.91 Women workers' average pre-tax income in 2007
was only 65.7% of the average male wage, a statistic that has shown
little improvement in a decade. 2 All of these factors add up to
growing household income insecurity and a care deficit that the
Canadian federal government has sought to address through family
policy reform in the past decade. Table 1 lists federal initiatives that
have been implemented in the post-CHST era.
Table 1. Major Canadian Family Policy Initiatives, 1996-2009
A Income Security
1996 Unemployment Insurance Reforms-Renamed Employment
Insurance ("El")
1998 Canada Child Tax Benefit ("CCTB"); National Child Benefit
Supplement ("NCBS")
2000 Maternity and Parental Benefit extended through El to 50
weeks
2003 Child Disability Benefit
2007 Working Income Tax Credit
2009 Registered Disability Savings Plan
B Care
1998 Caregiver Tax Credit
2000 Early Childhood Development Initiative
2003 Multilateral Framework on Early Learning ("ELCC")
2004 Compassionate Care Benefit through El
2006 Universal Child Care Benefit
Note: Compiled by Author
90. More Women in the Workforce than Men, EDMONTON J. (Alberta), Sept. 6, 2009,
at A9; see also Trish Hennessy & Armine Yalnizyan, Canada's "He-Cession": Men
Bearing the Brunt of Rising Unemployment, BEHIND NUMBERS, July 2009, at 1, 1-2,
available at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sitesldefaultlfiles/uploads/publications/
NationalOfficePubs/2009/HeCession.pdf (showing that men were disproportionately
affected because of job losses in the manufacturing sector where they dominate).
91. JANE BEACH ET AL., EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE IN CANADA
2008, at 179 (8th ed. 2009).
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A. Income Support
1. Unemployment Insurance
Normally, Unemployment Insurance ("Ul") is not categorized as
a family policy, but the peculiarities of the Canadian scheme have
made it an important plank in family income security and care policy.
Initially conceived as an insurance scheme for full-time workers,
Canada's UI program was steadily eroded throughout the 1990s as
rules governing eligibility were tightened and benefits reduced. In
1996, the program was renamed Employment Insurance ("El") and
important structural changes were introduced, making hours worked
instead of weeks worked the basis for calculating eligibility.93 On the
face of it, these changes were supposed to respond to the risks of an
increasingly precarious labor market, making it easier for part-time
workers to qualify for benefits. 4 But, in typical actuarial style,
eligibility was calibrated against risk: the number of hours required
for El benefits was set so high that few part-time workers, often those
most vulnerable to unemployment, qualified, and the proportion of
workers that could claim benefits dropped precipitously.95 In 1990, for
example, 83% of unemployed workers paying into the scheme were
covered by UI, in contrast to 2008 when only 43% qualified.96 EI, in
other words, excludes 60% of the unemployed at any point in time.97
As a result, there has been a massive shift in the risks and costs of
market instability and unemployment to individuals and families,
generally those with the least capacity to bear the weight of income
loss. With six out of ten workers paying into but not withdrawing
from the program, El surpluses ballooned in the late 1990s, and the
federal government began to redirect unemployment premiums to
fund other family income security programs, specifically maternity,
parental, and compassionate care benefits as well as government debt
reduction.98 Only 60% of expenditures in the El account actually go
to families to replace lost earnings due to unemployment.9 9 This
policy change is directly related to rising working-age poverty in
93. See CAMPEAU, supra note 60, at 155.
94. See id.
95. See YALNIZYAN, supra note 81, at 34-38.
96. See KEN BATTLE & SHERRI TORJMAN, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN POVERTY
REDUcTION 8 (2009), http://www.caledoninst.org/Publications[PDF/766ENG.pdf.
97. TOWNSON, supra note 92, at 12.
98. See YALNIZYAN, supra note 81, at 39, 70.
99. LARS OSBERG, CANADA'S DECLINING SOCIAL SAFETY NET: THE CASE FOR EI




Canada, especially among such "at risk" groups as recent immigrants,
the disabled, Aboriginal Canadians, and single mothers. More
importantly, I argue that the evolution of El progressively embodies
neoliberal assumptions about the market as the primary source of
individual and family wellbeing and the responsibility of individuals
and families to cushion the negative consequences of frictional and
structural unemployment. Without unemployment benefits, displaced
workers, in effect, are forced into the labor market to take any job or
to rely on kin to help them through their hard times.
2. Maternity and Parental Benefits
Canada began to use unemployment insurance premiums to fund
maternity and parental leave programs in 1971, initially covering
fifteen weeks of leave for biological mothers."°° The program was
expanded in 1984 to include adoptive parents, and in 1990, it was
extended by ten weeks, which could be shared by mothers and
fathers.1"' With the El account bulging, the El program was revised in
2000 to extend maternity and parental leave for the care of newborn
and newly adopted children to a maximum of fifty weeks (plus a two
week qualifying period). 2 Approximately 90% of claimants for
maternity and parental leave are mothers, and, in 2007,
approximately 64% of births benefited from this much applauded
federal initiative. °3 In 2009, the payment rate was 55% of a maximum
insured earned income, amounting to a weekly income of $447.00.11
While generous by American standards, this program advantages
moderate to high income as well as dual income earner families."'S
"Women with lower incomes tend to return to work much sooner
(within four months) than those with higher incomes (nine to twelve
months).'
10 6
Self-employed and contract workers do not have access to paid
maternity and parental leave except in the province of Quebec."7 In
January 2006, the province implemented the Regime Quebecois
100. See CAMPEAU, supra note 60, at 85-87.
101. Gregg M. Olsen, Toward Global Welfare State Convergence, J. Soc. & Soc.
WELFARE, June 2007, at 143, 149.
102. Martha MacDonald, Income Security for Women: What About Employment
Insurance?, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR WOMEN, supra note 52, at 251, 260.
103. BEACH ET AL., supra note 91, at 4.
104. Olsen, supra note 101, at 149.
105. MacDonald, supra note 102, at 260.
106. BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 27.
107. Diane Gabrielle Tremblay, Quebec's Policies for Work-Family Balance: A Model
for Canada?, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR WOMEN, supra note 52, at 271, 272.
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d'assurance Parentale ("RQAP"). 10 8 This program, unique in Canada,
provides benefits for every eligible worker-salaried and self-
employed-for maternity leave, parental leave, paternity leave, or
adoption leave."°9 The plan allows new parents to select between two
options-a longer leave period with lower benefits and a shorter
leave period with higher benefits. 10 Importantly, the plan eliminates
the two-week qualifying period, which continues to be required by
the El scheme, significantly increases the maximum insurable income,
admits workers with as little as $2,000 insurable income, and includes
self-employed workers."' The Quebec plan also includes a three-
week leave period that is only available to fathers. 1 2 While providing
more income security to new parents and better opportunities for
parents to care for newborn and adopted children, the plan also has
coincided with a baby boom in the province."' Since 2006, the
birthrate in Quebec has increased by 8%, the biggest jump since
1909.114
3. Child Benefits
The Canadian Child Tax Benefit ("CCTB") and the National
Child Benefit Supplement ("NCBS"), introduced in 1997 and
implemented in 1998, are the most ambitious and expensive family
policy initiatives in a generation."5 A monthly payment to help
families defray the costs of raising children was a formative and
integral part of Canada's postwar social policy regime. A mothers'
allowance, also known as "baby bonus," first introduced in 1944,
provided mothers with a modest sum for each of their children until
they reached adulthood. 1 6 This program diminished in significance
beginning in the 1970s, when it was only partially indexed against
inflation, and in the late 1980s, when it was taxed back from all but
the neediest families."7 In 1993, the family allowance was eliminated
and replaced with an income tested Child Tax Credit ("CTC"). 118 The
108. Id. at 280.
109. Id. at 280-82.
110. Id. at 281.
111. Id. at 281-82.
112. MacDonald, supra note 102, at 261.
113. Tremblay, supra note 107, at 272.
114. Id.
115. See YALNIZYAN, supra note 81, at 80.
116. See Jenson, supra note 46, at 192-93.
117. Id. at 193.
118. Id. Breaking with this trend of reducing and targeting financial support for
families, the Quebec government introduced an Allowance for Newborn Children in 1988,
which provided up to $8,000 tax-free to parents of newborns. Gary Marr, Next Cutback?
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CTC did little to alleviate child poverty in Canada, which had been
placed at the top of the social policy agenda in 1989 when the federal
government pledged to end child poverty in Canada by 2000.119
The CCTB and the NCBS introduced in the 1997 federal budget
was yet another attempt to tackle the stubborn problem of child
poverty.1 20 It also was the case, however, that amidst ever louder
neoliberal rhetoric, children had become almost the sole remaining
group that could legitimately make claims on the state for financial
support.1 21 The CCTB provided a refundable tax credit for all families
with children up to a specified taxable income while the NCBS
offered additional support for low income families with children.
Since its introduction, the federal government has repeatedly raised
the amount of the CCTB ($1,520 for the first child in 1997 to $3,416 in
2006) as well as the threshold of eligibility so that now the vast
majority of Canadian families receive this credit.122 The CCTB and
NCBS are widely credited with pulling many families, especially
single parent families headed by women, across the poverty line. The
poverty rate for this latter group was approximately 53% in 1996
compared to 28% in 2006.123 Families caring for a child with severe
and prolonged mental or physical impairment also are eligible for a
tax-free monthly payment, the Child Disability Benefit ("CDB"),
introduced in 2003, but only if their income falls below a particular
threshold. Currently, the maximum benefit is $2,500.124 Despite these
measures, the Conference Board of Canada reports that child poverty
rates have increased in this decade: from 12.8% in the mid-1990s to
15.1% in the mid-2000s. 125 In other words, these measures, while
reducing child poverty, are still inadequate to realize the federal
government's 1989 pledge to end child poverty.
126
Having Children: The Cost of Raising Children Push Some People to Put Off Having
Them, FIN. POST (Vancouver), July 11, 2009, at B2. Although this program boosted the
birthrate in the province, it was cancelled when the province introduced Canada's most
generous child care subsidy program in the late 1990s. Id.
119. See BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 28.
120. McKeen, supra note 52, at 73-74.
121. See BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 89.
122. See KEN BATTLE ET AL., THE FORGOTTEN FUNDAMENTALS 2 (2009), available
at http://www.caledoninst.org/Publications/PDF/727ENG.pdf ("The Canada Child Tax
Benefit is ... a broad-based program that serves the majority of Canadian families with
children, excluding only the wealthy.").
123. See BATTLE & TORJMAN, supra note 96, at 2.
124. BATTLE ET AL., supra note 122, at 2.
125. Conference Bd. of Canada, How Canada Performs (2009),
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/HCP/Details/society.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
126. See Jane Jenson, Changing the Paradigm: Family Responsibility or Investing in
Children, 20 CANADIAN J. SOC. 169,170 (2004).
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4. Working Income Tax Benefit
The CCTB and especially the NCBS were criticized by many as
being little more than "make work pay" or "welfare in work"
initiatives, that is, measures designed to provide the working poor
with marginally better incomes than those on social assistance, rather
than investments in children.127 As more and more families are
included under the umbrella of the CCTB, this assessment carries less
weight. The idea of "welfare in work," however, was implemented in
2007 with the refundable Working Income Tax Benefit ("WITB"),
which supplements the incomes of the working poor. 128 Although
slightly enhanced in the 2009 federal budget, the WITB is too small
(under $2,500) to provide income security for poor Canadians and
their families. The Conference Board of Canada reported in 2009 that
the poverty rate among working age Canadians (eighteen to sixty-five
years) has increased significantly since the mid-1990s. 129 Even before
the current recession, one in ten working age Canadians lived in
poverty, a proportion that places Canada fifteenth among seventeen
peer OECD countries. Only Japan and the United States have higher
poverty rates among their working age populations. 130 These statistics
reveal the federal government's social investments of the past decade
have been inadequate in addressing the challenges posed by rapidly
changing labor markets.
5. Registered Disability Savings Plan
The federal government's recent family policies have been
targeted to specific groups and often sit on the boundary between
income support and support for family care.' 3' The Registered
Disability Savings Plan ("RDSP"), launched in 2008, is a primary
example of how income support for targeted groups has been
127. See Alexandra Dobrowolsky & Jane Jenson, Shifting Representations of
Citizenship: Canadian Politics of Women and Children, 11 SOC. POL. 154, 171-72 (2004).
128. Canada Revenue Agency, Working Income Tax Benefits ("WITB"), www.cra-
arc.gc.calbnfts/wtb/menu-eng.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
129. Conference Bd. of Canada, Working-Age Poverty, http://www.conferenceboard
.ca/HCP[Details/society/working-age-poverty.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Information
Session-2007-The Registered Disability Savings Plan ("RDSP"),
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/learning/education-savings/publications resources/promoter/
communications/presentations/rdsp.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) (describing the RDSP,




legislated to stand in for care needs. 13 2 The RDSP, celebrated as the
first of its kind in the world, enables families to create a modest
financial nest egg for disabled Canadians to draw upon later in life,
presumably after primary caregivers can no longer provide care or
have died. 33 While complex, the plan allows for contributions to an
RDSP by or on behalf of anyone who qualifies as disabled, until the
beneficiary reaches the age of forty-nine.134 These contributions are
not tax deductible, but the income generated across the life of the
plan is not taxable.'35 The federal government, moreover, has
committed to enhance these personal plans with significant public
expenditures.136 Through the Canada Disability Savings Grant, the
federal government will match private contributions by 300, 200, or
100 percent up to an annual maximum of $3,500 and $70,000 over the
lifetime of the RDSP. 137 The government also commits to paying low
income applicants up to $1,000 per year through a Canada Disability
Savings Bond to help build their private plans up to a $20,000 lifetime
maximum.
13 8
In sum, then, the federal government has undertaken a number
of policy initiatives to shore up the incomes of Canadian families and
especially poor Canadians in an era of stagnating and declining
average incomes. These initiatives are welcome, but it also bears
repeating that these social policy reforms embody foundational
commitments to the primacy of the market income and family
networks in ensuring family wellbeing as opposed to the postwar
rationalities of collective provision and social security.
Unemployment insurance premiums, for example, no longer provide
a cushion for workers and their families in times of need; instead,
these premiums have been redirected to new parents, both to provide
income and to situate infant care within the confines of the family.
Other income security measures are intended to pull poor workers
and families from the ranks of social assistance into the paid labor
force but not to build on capacities to compete in the labor market. I
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B. Care
The provision of care for children, the disabled, and the elderly is
perhaps the most urgent and challenging social risk associated with
the disappearance of the postwar male breadwinner-dependent wife
model of social production. The unprecedented entry of women into
the paid labor force due to changing social norms, the erosion of the
family wage, and the growth of diverse family forms has fueled a
growing care deficit that has forced typical households to scramble to
meet their care needs.'39 Social demographers, moreover, characterize
today's parents as forming a "sandwich generation," which is
increasingly asked to devise caring solutions for both their children
and their aging parents. The Canadian government has introduced a
variety of initiatives in the past decade 140 to address the growing care
deficit. These family policies, however, privilege private and market-
based solutions, which are widely assessed as inadequate both for
typical families and for broader strategies of economic
competitiveness and social stability.
1. Compassionate Care
Although Canada has a universal health care system, it does not
address the critical and predictable life cycle demands of caring for
the elderly, the chronically infirm, and the terminally ill, who
increasingly are choosing to spend their final days at home. Policy
responses to these care needs have been arguably few and
insufficient. In 1998, for example, the federal government introduced
a Caregiver Tax Credit, in part to compensate for the unpaid work of
family caregivers. However, the tax credit can only be claimed against
taxable income, thereby excluding primary caregivers, predominantly
women, who do not have an independent source of taxable income.
Somewhat counterintuitively, then, men have claimed approximately
60% of this tax credit. 4' The gendered premise that only paid
workers should be compensated for care was further embedded in the
federal government's Compassionate Care Benefit ("CCB"), which
was introduced in 2004. Similar to maternity and parental leaves, the
CCB funds family caregivers through unemployment payroll
deductions. Workers are eligible for six weeks of paid leave through
139. See Gosta Esping-Andersen, Towards the Good Society, Once Again?, in WHY
WE NEED A NEW WELFARE STATE 1, 2 (Gosta Esping-Andersen ed., 2002) (explaining
that states need to facilitate women workers to increase their tax bases).
140. See supra Table 1.
141. BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 46.
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the EI program-within a twenty-six week period-but only if they
have six hundred insured hours and can demonstrate that their
weekly incomes have declined as a result of their care activities.1 2 For
those unable to qualify for El, the CCB allows employees who have
worked for at least three months to take a six week unpaid leave to
care for a family member who has a high and immediate risk of
dying.143 Since its introduction, the plan has been altered to allow for
a broader range of family members to access the program and to
share in caring responsibilities. The CCB, however, is firmly situated
in an adult-worker model where care resides in the family, and the
state facilitates this care only by compensating caregivers who
temporarily withdraw from the paid labor force to provide care.'"
As already discussed, the terms of El are prohibitive for most
part-time workers, while low income earners often cannot afford to
forfeit almost half of their income to care for a dying family member.
As important, I would suggest that the CCB also does not recognize
the ongoing family-work costs and strains experienced by workers
with frail parents or severely disabled family members who need
constant care but are not in immediate risk of dying. A recent study
of the "baby-boomer" generation found that 35% spent more than
forty-two hours a week caring for a parent or parents while 40%
indicated that they spent an average of $6,000 per year as
caregivers.' 4
2. Child Care
A significant family policy reform that occurred during the
period under review was the extension of maternity and parental
leave to fifty weeks for those eligible under the El program in 2000.146
While this policy change underwrites a strategy of private infant care,
child care and early childhood learning remains a vexing challenge for
many Canadian families. The provision of accessible, affordable, and
quality child care is widely recognized as a critical public
infrastructure to address childhood development, child poverty, the
142. MacDonald, supra note 102, at 263.
143. Service Canada, Employment Insurance Compassionate Care Benefits,
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/ei/types/compassionate-care.shtml (last visited Feb. 7,
2010).
144. MacDonald, supra note 102, at 262.
145. Linda Nguyen, Aging Parents a Second Job for Many Boomers, EDMONTON J.
(Alberta), Oct. 20, 2009, at A3.
146. BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 27.
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feminization of poverty, and family income security.1 47 This social
infrastructure arguably provides children with equitable early
learning environments and enables parents with young children to re-
enter the labor force, to retain earnings, and to maintain a dual-
earner family, increasingly the norm among lower- and middle-
income families. When compared to OECD peer countries, however,
Canada has consistently received failing grades in this vital field of
contemporary family policy. 148 Leading international agencies have
described Canada's child care system as a chronically underfunded
patchwork of inadequacy, ranking Canada last among developed
countries in terms of access to early learning and child care spaces.
149
In 2006, for example, an OECD study ranked Canada last of fourteen
countries with respect to investment in early childhood education and
child care services and last among twenty countries in relation to
access.15 ° Even after a flurry of legislative initiatives during this
decade, a December 2008 UNICEF study of twenty-five developed
countries ranked Canada last in meeting accepted standards of early
learning and child care:"' in fact, Canada met only one of the ten
enumerated benchmarks. 15 2 Only one in five Canadian children under
age twelve has access to a regulated child care space.153 This contrasts
with rates as high as 78% in Denmark, 60% in the United Kingdom,
and 40% in Portugal. 54
Although public opinion polls consistently demonstrate that
three out of four Canadians strongly favor the creation of a national
child care program, the federal government has been reluctant to
establish a national program with national standards, not the least
147. FAFIA-AFAI, IWD 2006: Childcare Is Key to Women's Equality,
http://www.fafia-afai.org/en/story/iwd-2006-childcare-key-womens-equality (last visited
Feb. 7, 2010).
148. See Jody Dallaire & Lynell Anderson, The Fight for a Publicly-Funded Child Care
System in Canada, 18 OUR SCHOOLS/OUR SELVES 25, 26-27 (2009) (discussing policies to
build child care infrastructure).
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http://www.unicef.ca/portalUSecure/Community/502/WCMIHELP/take-action/Advocacy/
rc8.pdf; MARTHA FRIENDLY, CHILD CARE RES. AND RESEARCH UNIT, BRIEFING
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10 (2006), available at http://www.childcarecanada.org/pubs/pdffBN-EarlyLearning06.pdf.
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because this is formally an area of provincial/territorial jurisdiction. 155
The federal government also signed an agreement with the provinces
and territories in 1999, the Social Union Framework Agreement, in
which it promised not to act unilaterally to establish future national
social policies. 56 In the absence of a national framework, provincial
and territorial governments typically have used various funds flowing
from the federal government for child care and early childhood
education to further entrench the prevailing privatized/market-based
model of child care services. 157 Some provinces have raised parent
subsidies without setting limits on the amount that private providers
can charge for child care services. For many families, child care is as
significant a drain on family finances as sending a child to
university.'58 Quebec stands out as an exception and policy leader in
this regard. In 1998, it launched a universal child care system the goal
of which was to provide regulated child care, for all parents who wish
to use it, for a minimal fee ($7 per day). Although the supply of
spaces has not kept up with demand, the province's allocation to early
learning and child care far surpasses the commitments of other
provinces in this area.
The federal government began to explicitly target transfers to the
provinces and territories for the development of child care
infrastructures when the Early Childhood Education Development
Agreement was unveiled in 2000.159 As part of the federal
government's National Children's Agenda, it provided funds to
support families and children in four broad areas, including early
childhood development, learning, and care. The agreement, however,
failed to tie federal funding to any performance measures, and,
consequently, the provinces used these federal funds in many
different ways, some only marginally related to child care. 6 ° In
response to domestic pressures and unfavorable international
rankings, Canada's government finally began to move toward a
national child care program in 2003 with the signing of the
155. Dallaire & Anderson, supra note 148, at 30-31 (citing CHILD CARE ADVOCACY
ASs'N OF CAN., CANADIAN'S ATTITUDES TOWARDS NATIONAL CHILD CARE POLICY
OVERVIEW (2006), http://www.ccaac.ca/pdf/resources/Reports/PollFactSheet.pdf).
156. See Alain Nodl, Power and Purpose in Intergovernmental Relations, in FORGING
THE CANADIAN SOCIAL UNION: SUFA AND BEYOND 47,47 (Sarah Fortin, Alain Noel &
France St-Hilare eds., 2002).
157. Dallaire & Anderson, supra note 148, at 26.
158. Id.
159. BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 31.
160. See YALNIZYAN, supra note 81, at 68 (arguing that a decade of federal spending
and policies have disadvantaged women).
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multinational framework on Early Learning and Child Care
("ELCC"). 161 "After sustained federal-provincial negotiation, this was
followed in 2004 by the Early Childhood Development and
Education Initiative ("ECDEI").1' 62 Separate five-year agreements
were concluded with selected provinces, enabling them to develop
child care strategies that were attentive to local needs, using federal
per capita grants to increase spaces and access. However, the election
of a minority Conservative government in 2006 brought these long-
awaited initiatives to an abrupt halt. Although the Harper
government indicated that it would honor the former government's
child care commitments to the provinces for a short period, the
foundations for a national child care program were replaced with the
Universal Child Care Benefit ("UCCB").
16 3
A fiscal social policy instrument, the UCCB provides a taxable
$1,200 per year (or $100 per month) for all children under six years of
age to assist in paying for child care."6 This universal benefit is a
significant public expenditure, providing parents with young children
with a nominal monthly allowance to spend as they wish. But it also
leaves parents with full responsibility to develop individualized care
strategies among a limited range of personal or expensive private
sector options.165 This universal benefit also favors two-parent
families that can afford a stay-at-home parent to attend to child care
needs. Because the benefit is taxable against the income of the
lowest-paid spouse, families with one spouse either unattached or
minimally attached to the paid labor force arguably will realize larger
financial gains from the program than families with two working
parents or single parents in the workforce. One of the more
significant liabilities of the UCCB, I argue, is that it does not provide
adequate public support for building an early learning and child care
infrastructure in Canada. Although the plan initially allotted $250
million annually to create new spaces, child care advocates argue that
this commitment is inadequate to meet current need or future
demand.1 66 Currently, the federal government spends approximately
$5.6 billion on its early learning and child care envelope, but 80% is
dispersed through the UCCB, another 9% goes to the provinces, and




165. Dallaire & Anderson, supra note 148, at 25.
166. See BEACH ET AL., supra note 91, at xvi-xvii (discussing how there has been




11% is intended to support the creation of new child care spaces. 16 7
The rate of increase in new child care spaces, however, has dropped
precipitously since the introduction of the UCCB.
168
Also termed the "choice in child care benefit," the UCCB is
represented as a universal social benefit and a reinvestment in the
Canadian social fabric, which, purportedly unlike publicly delivered
programs, respects the autonomy and authority of parents by giving
families choice in meeting their child care needs. For child care
advocates, it is an inadequate policy instrument in both investment
and vision. The benefit is insufficient to cover the costs of regulated
day care and, if anything, provides only symbolic recognition of the
unpaid care work of women and intimate family networks. In fact, it
may reinforce traditional gendered biographies and traditional family
forms. The language of choice elevates the goal of individual liberty,
prioritizes "consumer sovereignty," and promotes the illusion that a
broad range of options are available to all parents.1 69 With dual-
earner families increasingly becoming the norm, few families can
choose to have one parent stay at home to care for a child, especially
if the subsidies for child care are unrealistically low. Clearly, as well,
single-earner families do not have this choice. Instead, inadequate
child care subsidies are more likely to underwrite part-time and
precarious employment for women, as families struggle to make
"ends meet" and care for their children and, increasingly, for other
family members such as aging parents. These so-called choices are
neither equal nor universal. To put a blunter edge on it, those who do
not have money do not have choice in child care, irrespective of
political rhetoric to the contrary.
170
In sum, then, Canada's reliance on the market to provide
affordable and accessible child care demonstrates a three-fold market
failure: the lowest child care access rates in the industrialized world;
the highest parental fees anywhere; and poor skills development,
remuneration, and retention rates among early childhood
educators.17'
167. Dallaire & Anderson, supra note 148, at 29.
168. ToWNSON, supra note 92, at 25.
169. Paul Kershaw, Choices Discourse in BC Child Care: Distancing Policy from
Research, 37 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 927, 929-30 (2004).
170. See ToWNSON, supra note 92, at 25.
171. Dallaire & Anderson, supra note 148, at 26.
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CONCLUSION
This Article began by advancing three propositions about the
relationship between globalization and family policy: first, the
influence of globalization on social policy is neither direct nor
uniform but, instead, is strongly mediated by the extent to which
national governments have deployed neoliberal political rationalities
in policy design and implementation; second, analyses of
contemporary family policy should be as concerned with the ways in
which states frame policy reforms as with how much governments
spend; and, finally, neoliberalism is most productively understood as a
contested political rationality that weaves foundational commitments
to market logics, individualization, economic calculations of
efficiency, and multiple sites of authority into new public policies and
regulatory fields and onto existing ones. This review of Canadian
family policy reforms demonstrates each of these tendencies,
especially the core roles assigned to the market, market solutions, and
the self-sufficient individual/family in the design of new social policy
initiatives that are intended to respond to some of the social risks
generated directly and indirectly by economic globalization.
The family policy reforms discussed in this Article are saturated
with foundational commitments both to the primacy of market
income as the currency for family wellbeing and to the exclusion of
the public sector as a space for social planning, collective insurance,
and social provision. The disappearance of the family wage and the
declining financial capacities of middle- and lower-income families in
the past two decades have been met with targeted, conditional, and
meager tax credits for the working poor, child benefits conditional on
income, a small baby bonus masking as a child care program, and
privatized savings plans for the disabled.172 None of these policies,
however, chart a trajectory up the income ladder. Neither do they
aspire to close the growing income gap among Canadian families,
which opens the future for some children and closes it for too many
others.
Most of the family policy reforms that Canadian national
governments have unveiled in the past decade, I argue, have been
implemented through fiscal policy, specifically through tax credits and
benefits. The fiscalization of social policy means that social policy
goals are pursued only indirectly through direct cash payments, tax
credits, tax benefits, and tax deductions that are applied against
172. See TOWNSON, supra note 92, at 6 (discussing how contemporary policies continue
to disadvantage women, especially the poor and single mothers).
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earned income. Eligibility for many of these initiatives is determined
by or indexed to family income, while social needs are presumed to
be met through choices configured in the market and family spending
priorities.173 This implementation strategy rests on two powerful
assumptions: first, money can stand in for social planning, democratic
debate, public infrastructure, and community-building because
markets will respond to consumer demand; and, second, families will
use relatively small increments in family income for their designated
policy goal. These are, at best, questionable assumptions for a great
many families that are coping with declining incomes, economic
insecurity, unemployment, and rising debt. Initiatives nominally
designated to support care needs are easily converted, through
fiscalization, into modest family income support measures. Such
support is increasingly necessary for the growing ranks of
contemporary families that are struggling to make ends meet, but the
fiscalization of care policy does little to advance a work-life
reconciliation agenda, nor can it be assumed that markets will stand
in for the state, policy making, and public policy in the provision of
social infrastructures. Market solutions to public demand will not
materialize without the promise of profit.
Governmental responses to the growing care deficit typically fall
into three broad categories: (1) laissez-faire, where families are
expected to find their own solutions to their caring needs; (2) work-
family alternation, where policies enable parents, disproportionately
women, to give priority to care work or labor force participation at
different times in their lives; and (3) work-life balance, where policies
are explicitly designed to better enable families to combine domestic
and workforce demands.174 Canada's maternity, parental, and
compassionate care programs fit under the second alternating model,
but, as already noted, fiscalized care policies are a thinly veiled
laissez-faire approach and a handmaiden to individualization and
neoliberal representations of the self-sufficient individual/family.
Individualization effectively downloads responsibility for systemic
changes, such as deteriorating labor markets and the growth of
women's labor force participation, onto individuals and individuals
within families.175 It is a governing strategy that demands that people
find personal causes and responses, what Beck terms as "biographic
solutions," to what are in effect shared social challenges in a
173. BRODIE & BAKKER, supra note 54, at 45-46.
174. See Tremblay, supra note 107, at 273-75.
175. See Janine Brodie, Reforming Social Justice in Neoliberal Times, 1 STUD. SOC.
JUST. 93, 103 (2007).
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globalizing era, such as those relating to social reproduction and
care.'76 This governing strategy demands that we take responsibility
for and contrive solutions to our own problems, our own
circumstances, and our own decisions, including child-bearing and
rearing. The problem with this formulation is not that individuals,
both inside and outside of families, do not try to seek solutions to
their particular needs or comply with individualized solutions when
forced upon them. 77 Rather, the problem, as Bauman explains, is that
the very formulation of a "biographic solution to systemic
contradictions is an oxymoron; it may be sought but it cannot be
found."'78 He continues, "the subjects of contemporary states are
individuals by fate: the factors that constitute their individuality-
confinement to individual resources and individual responsibility for
the results of life choices-are not themselves matters of choice."'79
The 2008 financial crisis and its devastating social aftermath
betray the recklessness of this social imagination. It has conjured up a
perfect storm for too many families, who arguably have never been so
exposed on so many fronts to the vagaries of the market but,
nonetheless, are expected to find personal solutions to such systemic
factors as rampant unemployment, the collapse of equity markets and
pension plans, and a social architecture that has failed to adequately
adjust to the social risks generated by economic globalization.
Governmentality theorists, as described at the beginning of this
Article, contend that political rationalities inform both the
identification of "the problem" and "the solution" in the policy-
making process. These rationalities are neither good nor bad on some
grand scale of evaluation, but they do create their own consequences,
both intended and unintended. The 2008 financial crisis was, in part,
an unintended consequence of neoliberal political rationalities but so
too were the solutions, the massive financial interventions by
governments everywhere, but especially in North America, to prop
up financial markets to the exclusion of multiplying social deficits-
otherwise captured in the metaphor of Wall Street, or, in Canada's
case, Bay Street, and Main Street. This policy response revealed that
policy makers remain firmly entrenched in a neoliberal mindset-one
that constructs the market as the foundation for social wellbeing and
social progress. Dissenting voices, many arguing for public
176. BECK & BECK-GERNSHEIM, supra note 1, at 22-26; Brodie, The New Social
"isms," supra note 48, at 159-60.
177. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, THE INDIVIDUALIZED SOCIETY 105-06 (2001).
178. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, SOCIETY UNDER SIEGE 68 (2002).
179. Id. at 69.
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investments in social infrastructures and new technologies to promote
sustainable social reproduction, have been sidelined in the debate
about how to revive the fragile global economy. Perhaps more
disquieting, massive public bailouts of the private sector and sky-
rocketing governmental debt promise to constrain future endeavors
to steer the ship of state to a more socially sustainable future.
Ultimately, however, the future of family-friendly social policy reform
hinges less on budgetary constraints than on the ways that the
challenges and social risks of daily life are named and understood.
Meaningful policy change is always preceded by shifting social
imaginaries and new idioms of politics. Recovery from the current
economic crisis will require a return to stability in global financial
markets, but it also demands much more. It demands naming the
omissions of neoliberalism and searching for policy solutions that find
their legitimacy, not in the myth of the market but in the improved
lives of ordinary citizens. It invites reflection on a fundamental
political question: namely, what is government for? The answer to
that question must surely entail the economic security and growing
care needs of families, in all their variety.
2010] 1591
1592 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88
